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Abstract
In order to advise a cloud client whether to use cloud services or not, we model the scenario of utilization of cloud
computing based on Bayesian games. These games are strategic games with incomplete information for modeling the
interaction between a client and a cloud provider with uncertainty about load capacity. However these games do not
normally consider the reasoning abilities of players. One solution is to use formal logics which allow for modeling the
reasoning abilities of agents as well as allowing formal reasoning about certain properties of games such as the solution
of games. In this paper, we propose an epistemic logic to study strategic games with incomplete information. In this
logic we can for instance precisely describe what the requirements and consequences of informative actions are in the
cloud services scenario. We can reason what rational agents should do if they can choose between diﬀerent available
actions. In addition, this language can be used as a semantically well-deﬁned query language for model checkers to
automatically verify the game descriptions with respect to their intended speciﬁcations.
c© 2011 Published by Elsevier Ltd.
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1. Introduction
The term cloud computing implies computing is performed on centralized facilities by third-party com-
pute and storage utilities [1]. Clients use cloud computing for the resources and also pay based on the
usage. Cloud providers rent their resources to multiple clients concurrently and charge them depending on
the amount of resources used by the customers. The current pricing strategies are quite preliminary [2],
as these strategies do not consider the consequence of clients sharing the cloud’s resources. Although the
isolation of a client’s usage of the cloud is guaranteed, a client’s job can take longer to run when the cloud is
heavily loaded. In [3], the authors have proposed a game-theoretical approach to analyze the characteristics
of beneﬁts of cloud computing for clients and providers. In this paper we model the utilization of cloud
services as Bayesian games, in which clients have imperfect information because there are diﬀerent load
capacities when using the cloud.
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Games with incomplete information or Bayesian games provide a natural and compelling model that
enables understanding actions of players under uncertainty [4]. However these models do not provide any
mechanisms for players (clients and providers) to reason about diﬀerent situations in these models. One
solution is to use formal logics for the speciﬁcation of these models. The advantage of logic approaches are
that we can specify the properties of agents and multi-agent systems as logical axioms and theorems in the
language with clear semantics. Therefore there is no ambiguity in the speciﬁcation and everything is explicit.
Furthermore, properties, interrelationships and inferences are open to examination. In comparison to logic,
computer programs need implementation and control aspects speciﬁed within. Thus the issues, which are to
be tested and/or veriﬁed, can often become confusing [5]. Modal logics also enable automated veriﬁcation
by model checking speciﬁcations. To verify a model of a system, the model should be constructed, and
tested that this model satisﬁes a formula specifying the system.
The aim of this paper is to represent and reason about the utilization of cloud computing with formal
logics. We develop a formal language for representing Bayesian games. There are several approaches for
considering uncertainty in a logic that involves the quantiﬁcation of uncertainty [6]. In this paper, we use
beliefs about uncertainty to model Bayesian games. The logic for Bayesian games is an extension of the
epistemic logic for normal form games and our work has been inspired from [7] and [8]. We introduce
several special propositions and axioms to model Bayesian games. We also apply the extended logic to
model the cloud service scenario as a Bayesian game. We then illustrate reasoning for the solution concept
in this game.
The structure of this paper is as follows. We begin by presenting cloud computing characteristics. Then
we model cloud computing as Bayesian games because of uncertainty about diﬀerent load capacities. Next,
we present the syntax and the semantics of the extended epistemic logic for Bayesian games. Following, we
use the logic for reasoning about the solution concept of these games. The paper concludes with a summary
and discussion of future work.
2. Cloud Computing Characteristics
A company-owned data center is costly in regard to equipment and operation. Cloud service is an
alternative to use such a data center. To develop a cloud one should consider the workload and by this
consideration the assumption of constant price is insuﬃcient. In [3], the reason for the previous claim
is clariﬁed. If the cloud provider chooses a price that is less than the cost of an owned data center, the
demand for cloud will stay constant. If the price of cloud is higher than the cost of the owned data center
at full workload, there is a break-even workload at which the suggested price and the cost of the data
center is equal. The break-even property can be considered as a decreasing function of price. For a client
with a workload higher than the break-even workload, it is not suitable to use the cloud at the given price.
Therefore, a price higher than the break-even price makes the cloud more expensive compared to the data
center option. Based on above setting, a provider should oﬀer diﬀerent prices not only based on the cost of
maintaining the cloud but also for diﬀerent workloads. The customer when the oﬀer price is less than the
break-even price might use the cloud and build a data center when the price is higher than the break-even
price. The other option is that the client combines the use of cloud and data center depending on diﬀerent
workloads.
The proposed game-theoretic approach by [3] tries to model could computing as a suitable alternative
to a company-owned data center. This study provides more analytical perspective that leads to better un-
derstanding of the ﬁnancial aspects. Such knowledge may prevent wrong decision on both the client and
the provider sides. We model the combination of cloud and own data center as Bayesian games. The
recommended action for the client based on diﬀerent load capacities is the solution of these games.
3. Cloud Computing as Bayesian Games
A game for using the cloud for processing is introduced in [3]. The game has two players, the client and
the cloud provider. The cloud provider has the strategy to oﬀer diﬀerent prices. These prices are based on
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diﬀerent criteria such as network hardware cost, maintenance cost and increasing revenue. The client can
build its own data center or use the cloud. The question for the client is whether to use the cloud or not.
This question can be interpreted for the provider as is to make the best decision for oﬀering the prices. This
game can be played under diﬀerent load proﬁles which model the capacity in use. Some capacity is always
in use (base load) and some capacity is idle at times (peak load)[3] .
player 2
build data center use the cloud
player 1
price1=22 ct/h 0,-1.29 0.23,-0.23
price 2=44 ct/h 0,-1.29 0.45,-0.45
price 3=66 ct/h 0,-1.29 0.66,-0.66
Table 1. Payoﬀ matrix based on 2% peak load capacity θ = 0 [3]
The payoﬀs shown in table 1 and table 2 are based on the case study discussed in [3]. There are two
numbers in each cell, which the right number is the provider’s proﬁt and the left one is the client’s cost.
From the client’s perspective some situations are disproportionally expensive to self provide such as when
the total capacity demand exceeds base loads. The reason is that costs are only amortized over the time
during when the necessary capacity is actually used. The solution is to build a smaller data center to meet
base load and buy instances from the cloud to meet peak demand. Therefore we can have diﬀerent games
with the same strategy and diﬀerent payoﬀs. As the provider does not know which action client would
play, he might consider all the possible situations. The client plays all the games at the same time. These
games are diﬀerent based on demanding diﬀerent load capacities, and the provider oﬀers diﬀerent prices for
diﬀerent load capacities.
player 2
build data center use the cloud
player 1
price1=22 ct/h 0,-1.29 0.46,-0.46
price 2=44 ct/h 0,-1.29 0.91,-0.91
price 3=66 ct/h 0,-1.29 1.36,-1.36
Table 2. Payoﬀ matrix based on 50% peak load capacity θ = 1 [3]
In [3] they propose formulas for client and provider payoﬀs. They show that there is a subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium with the client combining building a data center and using the cloud. Another way of
solving the problem of using the cloud or not is to model it as a Bayesian game, which means to play all
these games at the same time with some probability. Due to the uncertainty in Bayesian games, a Bayesian
game is modeled as a set of games that diﬀer only in their payoﬀs, and a common prior deﬁned over them.
For Bayesian games the counterpart of the Nash equilibrium is called the Bayes-Nash equilibrium. This
equilibrium for agent i is a mixed strategy proﬁle which is the best response to a mixed strategy proﬁle of
the other player. The Bayes-Nash equilibrium may seem conceptually complicated. However, the solution
is to construct a normal form representation that corresponds to a given Bayesian game.
Because we have only two games (based on the case study), we assume the probability of 2% peak load
capacity game happening is equal to that of 50% peak load capacity game happening. This representation
is called an induced normal form. The next step is to build an induced normal form game for this Bayesian
game.
Table 3 shows payoﬀs of the induced normal game. This matrix of payoﬀs is obtained by considering
the probability of game in table 1 happening is equal to 1/2 and the probability of game in table 2 happening
is equal to 1/2. The payoﬀ matrix shows that if the provider proposes price2 in game 1 (table 1) and price
1 in game 2 (table 2), also if the client in game 1 chooses to build the data center and in game 2 uses the
cloud services, the provider gets 0.23 and the client pays 0.875. The Nash equilibrium for the Bayesian
game is recognizable from its induced normal form. As an example, if the provider oﬀers price 2 and price
3 in game 1 and game 2, respectively, the Nash equilibrium for the client is to use the cloud and build a data
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player2
build build build use use build use use
player1
price1 price1 0,-1.29 0.23,-0.875 0.115,-0.758 0.345,-0.345
price1 price2 0,-1.29 0.445,-1.100 0.115,-0.758 0.56,-0.56
price1 price3 0,-1.29 0.68,-1.325 0.115,-0.758 0.795,-0.795
price2 price1 0,-1.29 0.23,-0.875 0.225,-0.870 0.455,-0.455
price2 price2 0,-1.29 0.445,-1.100 0.225,-0.870 0.670,-0.670
price2 price3 0,-1.29 0.68,-1.325 0.225,-0.870 0.905,-0.905
price3 price1 0,-1.29 0.23,-0.875 0.33,-0.975 0.56,-0.56
price3 price2 0,-1.29 0.445,-1.100 0.33,-0.975 0.775,-0.775
price3 price3 0,-1.29 0.68,-1.325 0.33,-0.975 1.01,-1.01
Table 3. Induced normal form
center in game 1 and 2, respectively.
This is the Bayesian game approach to modeling whether using the cloud. In the next section we propose
an epistemic logic approach to model the situation and reason about the solution.
4. Epistemic logic for Bayesian games
In this section we present a formal language for expressing cloud utilization beneﬁts. We consider the
problem of specifying the criteria of using the cloud for a client regarding the price and load capacities.
Toward this end, we need a formal language in which we may express rules of the using cloud, that is, a set
of rules that determine the optimum strategies under diﬀerent criteria. This language can capture diﬀerent
load capacity. It is abstract and it is not dependent on any speciﬁc condition. As in section 3 we have shown
that using the cloud can be modeled as a Bayesian game, this formal language should be able to be used to
specify the rules of Bayesian games.
The example rules for playing this game are:
1. The client should choose one action for each peak load. Also the provider should oﬀer one price.
2. The provider knows the price and the client knows his actions.
3. The client and the provider know their own payoﬀs.
4. The strategy of the client is rational if it maximizes the client’s expected payoﬀ.
Fig. 1. States of the game
This game can be modeled by the state transition diagram shown in ﬁgure 1. The diagram is regarded as
a Kripke structure which can be used to provide semantics for the epistemic logic, which is a kind of modal
logic. As can be seen in ﬁgure 1, we have 12 states. The ﬁrst six states are the diﬀerent states of game table 1
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and the rest of the states are the states of game table 2. The symbol θ in the states is the type of players based
on diﬀerent load capacity. For diﬀerentiating between the various types, we use a subscript for θ, where θ0
means game 1(table 1) and θ1 means game 2(table 2). We develop a language for representing Bayesian
games based on a particular vocabulary. In ﬁgure 1 we used the propositional symbol 1price1 to mean the
provider (player 1) oﬀers price1. To ﬁnd the game solution for a Bayesian game we need to model the
induced normal form game. Figure 1 models the induced normal form game (table 3). In ﬁgure 1 players,
their actions and diﬀerent games are more straightforward to recognize compared to those properties in
matrix payoﬀ induced normal form game (table 3). The lines between the states represent reachable states.
For keeping the ﬁgures readable, we did not draw all the lines and also there is no diﬀerent meaning behind
solid lines and dash lines. The reachable states mean that if the client and the provider are in state 1 they can
choose for the next game to play any of the states 7 to 12. It should be considered that the client knows that
the provider is rational and also the provider knows that the client is rational. The propositional symbols
rattype1 and rattype2 capture the rationality of the client and the provider, respectively. The knowledge that
the client knows the provider is rational is shown in ﬁgure 2. It is clear that the states 7 to 12 represent the
same knowledge and rattype1 is true in all of them. Therefore the states 7 to 12 for the client in state 1 are
all equally possible, which is considered as the knowledge of the client. Now that we intuitively introduced
the epistemic logic, we deﬁne it more formally bellow.
Fig. 2. Knowledge about rationality
The epistemic logic is a multi-modal logic with n operators K1,K2, ...,Kn where for i = 1, ..., n, Kiϕ
means that player i knows that ϕ. Another modality in this language is Pi(.) =. We use this syntax introduced
by [9] for probabilistic expressions. Pi(.) = . represents i’s probabilistic belief of player i’s type.
The logical symbols used are ¬ (negation), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → (implication), and ↔
(equivalence). The conjunction (disjunction) of all sentences from a ﬁnite set Σ is abbreviated by
∧
Σ (
∨
Σ),
assuming commutativity. If the ϕi enumerate Σ we may also write
∧
i ϕi (
∨
i ϕi). Before we go through
the propositions and axioms of the epistemic logic, we should give a clear meaning for notation θni . This
notation denotes a set of types for player i, which means: θni = {θi,1, θi,2, ..., θi,n}. In this deﬁnition θni says
that player i has n diﬀerent types. The other critical notation is θni,n(−i) that describes a set of types for player
i in combination with other players’ types. The language has a knowledge operator Ki, one for each agent
i ∈ N. Basic propositions are:
• The propositional symbols imθni stand for the statement ‘player i plays his mth strategy in his θni type’.
• The proposition ui(1k1 , ...,NkN , θni , θn(−i) ) = ri,1k1 ,...,NkN ,θni ,θn(−i) denotes that the utility for player i with
type θni , when the strategy proﬁle (1k1 , ...,NkN ) is played in combination with other players types θn(−i) ,
equals the number r.
• R is a set of countably many symbols such as r. The elements of R represent real numbers. In other
words, R is a countable subset of the set of real numbers.
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• The proposition ri,1k1 ,...,im,...,NkN 	ri,1k1 ,...,in ,...,NkN states that for player i his mth strategy is at least as good
as his nth strategy.
• The proposition rattypei denotes the rationality of player i, in the sense that i is an expected utility
maximizer.
The proposition that captures the rationality of player i with type θni is called rattypei. The axiom
RATType (1) which is the formalism of utility maximization by considering a player’s type is deﬁned as the
following equivalence:
rattypei ↔
∧
mΘ i
((Ki
∧
1k1 ,...,NkN
∑
1k1 ,...,NkN
Pi(θni,n(−i) )ui(1k1 , ...,NkN , θi,ni , θ−i,n(−i) ) =
ri,1k1 ,...,NkN ,θni ,θ−n(−i) ∧ imθni )→
∧
1ki
∑
m
pmθni .ri,1k1 ,...,im,...,NkN ,θni ,n(−i)
≥
∑
1ki
p1k1θni ri,1k1 ,...,ii,...,NkN ,θni ,n(−i) ) (1)
The above axiom states that player i is a utility maximizer whenever, if he decides to play his mθ ith
strategy in a situation in which he has probabilistic beliefs Pi(θni , n(−i)) about the utility (captured by the
ri,k,l,θni ,θn(−i) ) then the mθni th strategy is better than any other, given his beliefs.
Due to page limitations, we brieﬂy outline the main ideas behind developing a formal semantics. On the
semantic side we use Kripke structures 〈Ω,K1, ...,Kn〉 where Ω is a set of states or possible worlds and for
every i ∈ {1, ..., n},Ki is a binary accessibility relation on Ω. For every w ∈ Ω and for every i ∈ {1, ..., n} let
Ki(w) = {w′ ∈ Ω : wKiw′}.
In order to illustrate the syntax and examine the expressivity of the language, we present some rules for
playing this game are using the formal language:
1. The client should choose exactly one action for each peak load. Also the provider should oﬀer exactly
one price.
• (1price1θ0 → ¬(1price2θ0∨1price3θ0∨1price1θ1∨1price2θ1∨1price3θ1 ))∧(1price2θ0 → ¬(1price1θ0∨1price3θ0∨
1price1θ1 ∨1price2θ1 ∨1price3θ1 ))∧ (1price3θ0 → ¬(1price2θ0 ∨1price1θ0 ∨1price1θ1 ∨1price2θ1 ∨1price3θ1 ))∧
(1price1θ1 → ¬(1price2θ0∨1price3θ0∨1price1θ0∨1price2θ1∨1price3θ1 ))∧(1price2θ1 → ¬(1price2θ0∨1price3θ0∨
1price1θ0 ∨ 1price1θ1 ∨ 1price3θ1 ))∧ (1price3θ1 → ¬(1price2θ0 ∨ 1price3θ0 ∨ 1price1θ0 ∨ 1price2θ1 ∨ 1price1θ1 ))
• (2buildθ0 → ¬(2buildθ1 ∨ 2useθ0 ∨ 2useθ1 )) ∧ (2buildθ1 → ¬(2buildθ0 ∨ 2useθ0 ∨ 2useθ1 )) ∧ (2useθ0 →¬(2buildθ1 ∨ 2buildθ0 ∨ 2useθ1 )) ∧ (2useθ1 → ¬(2buildθ1 ∨ 2buildθ0 ∨ 2useθ0 ))
2. The provider knows the price, also the client knows his actions.
• K11price1θ1 ↔ 1price1θ1
• K22buildθ1 ↔ 2buildθ1
3. The client and the provider know their own payoﬀs.
• u1(1price1, 2use, θ0) = r1,1price1,2use,θ0 → K1(u1(1price1, 2use, θ0) = r1,1price1,2use,θ0 )
4. The strategy of the client is rational if it maximizes the client’s expected payoﬀ.
• rattype2 ↔ K2((P2(θ0)u2(1ptice1, 2build) ∧ P2(θ1)u2(1price2, 2build)) = r2,1price1,1price2,2build ,2build ,θ0,θ1 )
(P2(θ0)u2(1ptice1, 2build) ∧ P2(θ1)u2(1price2, 2use)) = r2,1price1,1price2,2build ,2use,θ0,θ1 ) ∧
(P2(θ0)u2(1ptice1, 2use) ∧ P2(θ1)u2(1price2, 2build)) = r2,1price1,1price2,2use,2build ,θ0,θ1 ) ∧
(P2(θ0)u2(1ptice1, 2use) ∧ P2(θ1)u2(1price2, 2use)) = r2,1price1,1price2,2use,2use,θ0,θ1 )→
p2useθ0 ∧ p2useθ1 r2,1price1,1price2,2use,2use,θ0,θ1
The set of rules are complete, and by following them we have the interaction between the client and the cloud
provider based on the game rules. In the next section we show that we can also use the formal language as
a query language to verify the solution of the game.
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5. Model Checking Procedure
The speciﬁcation of utilizing cloud by a logical language, enables us to verify the solution of the game by
model checking. In this section we propose an algorithm for model checking of these models. The problem
of model checking can be formally stated as follows: given a property (or a logical formula) ϕ, and a model
M, return the set of states Ω such that w ∈ Ω iﬀ ϕ is true at state w in M. The input model M here for model
checking algorithm is 〈π, 〈Ω,K1, ...,Kn〉〉, which is the same as the model deﬁned in section 4, besides it
has an extra function π. This function and other input parameters for the model checking algorithm are as
follows:
• The boolean variables imθni ,ui(1k1 , ...,NkN , θni , θn(−i) ) = ri,1k1 ,...,NkN ,θni ,θn(−i) , ri,1k1 ,...,im,...,NkN 	ri,1k1 ,...,in ,...,NkN and
rattypei.
• The function π(p) gives the set of states in which the atomic proposition p holds.
• Boolean functions RKi encoding the epistemic accessibility relations (For each agent i a function takes
as input a state w and a binary relation R on the set of states, and returns the set of states accessible
from w via R)
This algorithm is similar, to model checking techniques for modal logics [10] [11], without temporal
modalities.
function verify(ϕ,M) returns a subset of states {
ϕ is an atomic formula : return π(ϕ)
ϕ is ¬ϕ1 : return Ω \ veri f y(ϕ1,M)
ϕ is ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 : return veri f y(ϕ1,M) ∩ veri f y(ϕ1,M)
ϕ is Kiϕ1 : return {g|RKi (g) ⊆ veri f y(ϕ1,M)}}
In this algorithm we only have cases for logical symbols ¬,∧ but the formal language from section 4
supports the other symbols such as →,↔,∨. The reason is that the algorithm covers the minimal set, and
by this set we can express the other symbols.
This algorithm is correct, which means if, the algorithm is passed a formula ϕ and the model M =
〈π, 〈Ω,K1, ...,Kn〉〉, it returns the set of states at which ϕ is true. Above all, this algorithm terminates,
because the recursive calls are all on sub-formulae of the original formula. This is a veriﬁcation technique
for Bayesian game scenarios. This algorithm tests not only the game rules but also the solutions of the
games.
The property of these models, we are interested in checking is, if the provider proposes diﬀerent prices
what the client should do. We assume that the provider knows that the client is rational which can be written
as (K1(rattype2θ1 ). Also the provider oﬀers price 1 in game 1 which is 1price1θ0 and price 3 in game 2 that
is 1price3θ1 . Based on these information, the rational client should use the cloud service in game 1 and build
the data center in game 2. Such a formula can be directly written as:
(K1(rattype2θ1 ) ∧ (1price1θ0 ∧ 1price3θ1 ))→ (2useθ0 ∧ 2buildθ1 ) (2)
If this formula holds in the model, it is also the Nash equilibrium of the subgame.
6. Conclusion
We adopted a game-theoretic approach with uncertainty to analyze the interaction between a cloud client
and a cloud provider. We model this interaction with respect to diﬀerent load capacities as Bayesian games.
However the conceptual study of Bayesian game-playing situations cannot be used to derive stable results as
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long as no appropriate formalism is available to model the situation. The main purpose of this paper was to
show that a formal tool, namely epistemic logic for normal form games, can be used to represent and reason
about Bayesian games. However, special propositions and axioms are introduced to model the uncertainty of
players about payoﬀs in Bayesian games. We show that this language provides reasoning about the solution
for the client in Bayesian games. By using the language for representing and reasoning about Bayesian
games, an example application of this language is provided. Although we show the use of the extended
language to verify some speciﬁcations of Bayesian games such as the solution concept, these veriﬁcations
for these games can also be performed through model checking. In general, model checking allows us to
test whether a deﬁned model or system meets a given speciﬁcation. The inputs to a model checker are the
description of a system to be analyzed and a number of properties, often expressed as formulae of one kind
of logic. In the future, we plan to implement a model checker that supports the epistemic logic for Bayesian
games. Moreover, we will use this approach to model other applications such as security games and web
services negotiation.
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